Philosophy in Indian tradition as a purely secular and rational exercise can be located in the Lokayata/Carvaka school of Indian philosophy. Due to the lack of substantial literary sources, scholars did not try to explore Lokayata philosophically. The present work is the first attempt to explore the philosophical energies inherent in the scattered Carvaka literature through critical and analytical discussions firmly grounded in textual evidences.

This book offers a systematic and radical introduction to the Buddhist roots of Pātañjalayoga or the Yoga system of Patañjali. By examining each of 195 aphorisms of the Yogasūtra, along with discussions on the Yogabhāṣya, it shows that traditional and popular views on Pātañjalayoga obscure its true nature. The book argues that Patañjali's Yoga contains elements rooted in both orthodox as well as heterodox philosophical traditions, including Sāṅkhya, Jaina and Buddhist thought. With a fresh translation and a detailed commentary on (...) the Yogasūtra, the author unearths how several terms, concepts, and doctrines of Patañjali's Yoga can be traced to Buddhism, particularly the Abhidharma Buddhism of Vasubandhu and the early Yogācāra of Asaṅga. The work presents the Yogasūtra of Patañjali as a synthesis of two perspectives: the metaphysical perspective of Sāṅkhya and the empirical-psychological perspective of Buddhism. Based on a holistic understanding of Yoga, the study explores key themes of the text, such as meditative absorption, means, supernormal powers, isolation, Buddhist conceptions of meditation, the interplay between Sāṅkhya and Buddhist approaches to suffering and emancipation. It further highlights several new findings and clarifications on textual interpretation and discrepancies. An important intervention in Indian and Buddhist philosophy, this book opens a new way of looking at the Yoga of Patañjali in the light of Buddhism beyond standard approaches, and will greatly interest scholars and researchers of Buddhist studies, Yoga studies, Indian philosophy, philosophy in general, literature, religion and comparative studies, Indian and South Asian Studies, and the history of ideas. (shrink)

The study deals with some of the central issues concerning the notion of death as discussed in Theravāda (Pāli Buddhism) as well as Mahāyāna Buddhism. What is the sense that death is regarded as an instance of duḥkha (Sanskrit) or dukkha (Pāli)? The research claims that here, firstly, the word duḥkha/dukkha is used as an adjective (which means ‘unsatisfactory’) rather than a noun (which means 'pain' or 'suffering'). Secondly, by death, the Buddha did not mean the act of dying but (...) the experience of someone's death or the idea of death. The Buddha also talked about deathlessness as the goal. Here, deathlessness does not amount to accepting something eternal but developing a proper perspective towards death by meditations such as that on impurity ( аśubhabhāvanā ) and contemplation on death ( maraṇānussati ). If the cessation of the cycle of rebirths and re-deaths ( punarmṛtyu ) is the ultimate goal that the arhat (Sanskrit), or arahant (Pāli), achieves, then the same should apply to Tathāgata. In that case, the problem suggests itself: how could the question of Tathāgata’s existence after death be accounted for as an unanswerable ( avyākṛta )? The study opines that the reason behind this is the profound, immeasurable, unfathomable nature attributed to Tathāgata. The research also discusses the basic difference between the attitudes on death in Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna. Lastly, it deals with the question of whether termination of one’s own life is permissible in Buddhism under certain conditions. (shrink)

In the paper, the author addresses the question of Dharmakīrti’s philosophical identity afresh. While acknowledging both the elements, external realism of Sautrāintika and idealism of Yogācāra, the author does disagree with the claim which is sometimes made, that Dharmakīrti’s idealism as his ultimate position and accepts realism only at conventional level. The author shows how Dharmakīrti in Pramāṇavārttika oscillates between the two positions and that he must have been attracted to both the positions for different reasons. He was attracted to (...) idealism from critical point of view, when he was critical about the limitations of Sautrāntika realism (which itself can be called critical realism). He was attracted to realism for its capacity to explain the diverse phenomena and lead human beings to their goals. The author denies the claim made by some scholars that Dharmakīrti’s idealism can be called just an epistemic one. He argues that it did have a metaphysical dimension which is hard to defend. The author shows that Dharmakīrti’s idealist stance has adverse implications to the realist epistemology and logic which constitute his mainstream position; the implications, which Dharmakīrti does not take up for discussion. (shrink)

Apoha theory could perhaps be understood as a part of the Buddhist program of emancipating people from the clutches of attachment. Diṅnāga and thereafter Dharmakīrti, when they developed their epistemology of perception, inference, and language, pointed out that through perception we are associated with unique particulars, which are momentary. We try to give an enduring status to them through thought and language by constructing universals. Thus, thought and language amount to false constructions, and they also mark our attachment to the (...) world. Hence, the realization that helps in preventing such an attachment would imply that inference and language do not really ‘refer to’ or ‘associate themselves with’ what is .. (shrink)

This book examines the interface between Buddhism and the caste system in India. It discusses how Buddhism in different stages, from its early period to contemporary forms-Theravāda, Mahāyāna, Tantrayāna and Navayāna-dealt with the question of caste. It also traces the intersections between the problem of caste with those of class and gender. The volume reflects on the interaction between Hinduism and Buddhism: it looks at critiques of caste in the classical Buddhist tradition while simultaneously drawing attention to the radical challenge (...) posed by Dr B. R. Ambedkar's Navayāna Buddhism or neo-Buddhism. The essays in the book further compare approaches to varṇa and caste developed by modern thinkers such as M. K. Gandhi and S. Radhakrishnan with Ambedkar's criticisms and his departures from mainstream appraisals. With its interdisciplinary methodology, combining insights from literature, philosophy, political science and sociology, the volume explores contemporary critiques of caste from the perspective of Buddhism and its historical context. By analyzing religion through the lens of caste and gender, it also forays into the complex relationship between religion and politics, while offering a rigorous study of the textual tradition of Buddhism in India. This book will be useful to scholars and researchers of Indian philosophy, Buddhist studies, Indology, literature, exclusion and discrimination studies, history, political studies, women studies, sociology, and South Asian studies. (shrink)

The rivalry among the philosophical schools in India was not purely intellectual, but had far-reaching social implications. The rivalry between vedic and non-vedic schools had a socio-political dimension. This paper claims that commentaries of the source texts of schools on both sides played an important role in development of inter-darśana politics. This paper deals with some of the interpretative moves made by Vācaspatimiśra in his two famous commentaries: Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī, the commentary on Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, the commentary on Nyāyavārtika (...) of Udyotakara. The paper argues that some of Vācaspatimiśra’s interpretative moves in these commentaries can be called “political moves.” The paper shows how these interpretative moves deviate from the natural or unforced meanings of the texts. It argues that these deviations aim at strengthening the orthodox front of Indian philosophy. (shrink)

This paper provides a study of the three most famous skeptical thinkers of classical India, examining both their commonalities and unique differences. Adepts of the controversial debate methodology called vitaṇḍā, “negative debate,” these thinkers manage to challenge the very possibility of knowledge, while espousing (at least nominal) allegiance to distinct schools of thought. They also pass negative judgement on the possibility of certainty while appealing to rational persuasion. This paper explores these paradoxes and possible contradictions, with a culminating reflection of (...) the role of the “two truths,” ultimate vs. everyday perspectives. (shrink)

An accessible introduction to Cārvāka moral philosophy.